An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, operating from China. The chance to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China containing “non-public” or “insider” insights. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, China’s influential intelligence agency still considers it valuable to use headhunters to try it – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Massive Approaches on Professional Networks
In 2023, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. However a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and parliament has led the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage warning was issued on Tuesday via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the wider public better identify interactions with a deceptive purpose.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from within parliament, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency wants public figures to understand that just because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been reacting to a particular event in parliament, although the burst of activity does come after the awkward failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to warnings that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations face significant legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if somebody engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is particularly focused in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are distinct approaches as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is vast, engaging three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate people over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official informed MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean an individual quickly peripheral becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a level below the level of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is involved in relentless efforts to identify covert sources on UK politics online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it has the capability.
